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Since the recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada by section 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982, the inherent right of the Aboriginal peoples to govern
themselves has become a generally accepted aspect of Canadian constitutional law.1 But
what is the scope of the governmental authority, or jurisdiction, that is exercisable by
inherent right Aboriginal governments? And how does the jurisdiction of Aboriginal
governments interact with the jurisdiction of other governments in Canada, especially the
federal and provincial governments? This research paper will attempt to answer these
questions in a general way, without attempting to determine or assess the jurisdiction of
any particular Aboriginal government.
I will start by explaining some basic concepts relating to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
can be:
(1)

territorial, so that it is exercisable over a specific geographical area, such as
the traditional territory of an Aboriginal nation, and over any people who
happen to be physically present within that territory;

(2)

personal, so that it is exercisable over particular people, such as the citizens
of an Aboriginal nation, whether they are physically present in that nation’s
territory or not; or

(3)

a combination of territorial and personal.

Jurisdiction can also be either:

1

See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples,
Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) [Partners
in Confederation]; Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 2, Restructuring
the Relationship (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996), Pt. 1, 105-382 [RCAP Report]; Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Aboriginal Self-Government (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 1995); Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Gathering
Strength: Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997),
13; Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000] 4 C.N.L.R 1 (B.C.S.C.).
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(1)

exclusive, so that it can be exercised by only one government, which, in
Canada, could be an Aboriginal government, a provincial government, or
the federal government; or

(2)

concurrent, meaning that it is shared and can be exercised by two or more
governments, be they Aboriginal, provincial, or federal.

When jurisdiction is concurrent, rules are needed to determine which government’s laws
prevail in the case of conflicting exercises of jurisdiction. For example, where the federal
government and the provinces have concurrent jurisdiction over particular subject matters
such as agriculture and immigration, Canadian constitutional law provides that federal
laws are paramount (that is, they take precedence) over provincial laws in the event of a
direct conflict between them. This means that the provincial laws are inoperative to the
extent that they are in direct conflict with the federal laws.2
Jurisdiction can also be divided among the three branches of government in the
Canadian parliamentary system that came from Great Britain:
(1)

legislative jurisdiction, which is the authority of legislative bodies such as
the Parliament of Canada to make laws;

(2)

executive jurisdiction, which is the authority of the executive branch (for
example, the federal cabinet and government departments, such as Indian
Affairs) to make and implement government policy, and administer laws
made by legislative bodies; and

(3)

judicial jurisdiction, which is the authority of courts and other adjudicative
bodies to interpret and apply laws and to resolve legal disputes.

Under the Canadian Constitution, the order of government – Aboriginal, federal, or
provincial – that has legislative jurisdiction over a particular subject matter also has
executive jurisdiction over the same subject matter. Judicial jurisdiction, however, is not
so neatly divided, as the jurisdiction of courts does not depend on the distribution of
legislative and executive powers in the Constitution. Judicial jurisdiction will not be
dealt with in this paper.

2

to 16-20.

See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell), Loose-leaf Edition at 16-1
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Jurisdiction can be either inherent or delegated. The Parliament of Canada and
the provincial legislatures exercise legislative jurisdiction that was delegated to them
from the British Parliament by the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly the British North
America Act, 1867), though the source of the authority of the British Parliament to
legislate for Canada has never been adequately explained.3 The legislative authority of
the British Parliament over Canada was terminated by patriation of the Canadian
Constitution in 1982.4 Nonetheless, the jurisdictions of the Canadian Parliament and
provincial legislatures are still determined by the division of powers in the Constitution
Act, 1867, mainly contained in section 91 (listing federal powers) and section 92 (listing
provincial powers). Municipal governments, such as cities and towns, also exercise
jurisdiction in Canada, but this jurisdiction has been delegated to them, usually by
provincial legislation.

The three territorial governments in the Yukon, the Northwest

Territories, and Nunavut also exercise delegated jurisdiction, acquired from the
Parliament of Canada by legislation.
The inherent jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments is jurisdiction arising from
the existence of the Aboriginal nations in North America prior to the arrival of the
Europeans. Aboriginal nations who are also Indian bands under the Indian Act exercise
delegated jurisdiction as well, jurisdiction that has been conferred on them and their band
councils by the provisions of that Act.5 As the discussion in this research paper is limited
to the inherent jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments, delegated jurisdiction will not be
examined, and so the delegated authority of band councils will not be covered.6
3

In R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1103, the Supreme Court apparently took this legislative
authority for granted. For critical commentary, see Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem, “Aboriginal
Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow” (1991) 29 Alberta Law Review 498. Sákéj
Henderson takes the position that the British sovereign’s jurisdiction in North America had to be acquired
derivatively from the Aboriginal peoples by treaty: see James Youngblood Henderson, First Nations
Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights: Defining the Just Society (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 2006), 6, and “Empowering Treaty Federalism” (1994) 58 Saskatchewan Law Review
241, especially at 247-48 [Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism”].
4
Since 1982, when the Constitution Act, 1982 provided the means for the Canadian Constitution to
be amended in Canada, the British Parliament has had no authority over Canada. For discussion of the
implications of patriation for Canada as a nation-state, see Brian Slattery, “The Independence of Canada”
(1983) 5 Supreme Court Law Review 369.
5
For discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Challenging Legislative Infringements of the Inherent
Aboriginal Right of Self-Government” (2003) 22 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 329.
6
However, Indian bands do appear to have some inherent jurisdiction. For example, they have
inherent authority to choose their leaders by custom: see Bone v. Sioux Valley Indian Band No. 290 Council,
[1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 54 at 65 (F.C.T.D.); Jock v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1992] 1
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The term “Aboriginal governments” also requires clarification. As used in this
research paper, it refers to the governments of the Indian, Inuit and Métis nations who
have the inherent right to govern themselves. In some instances, these may be the nations
that occupied territories and exercised jurisdiction either prior to the arrival of Europeans
(in the case of the Indian and Inuit nations),7 or prior to the establishment of effective
European control (in the case of the Métis).8 It needs to be acknowledged, however, that
these nations do not necessarily all exist today as they existed at the time of European
colonization. The process of colonization has had a profound impact on the Aboriginal
nations, causing some of them to be fragmented into smaller units.9 For example, the
creation of Indian reserves and the imposition of the band council system by the Indian
Act resulted in the creation of Indian bands, many of which were previously part of larger
Indian nations. Many of these bands now call themselves First Nations. In its 1996
Report, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples suggested that the inherent right of
self-government of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada is held by the larger Aboriginal
nations, rather than by smaller units that it called “local communities” (a term I
understand to include most Indian bands).10 The Commission’s approach may not,
however, be suitable for all Aboriginal peoples today. Ultimately, I think identification
of the appropriate units for exercising the inherent right of self-government should be up
to the Aboriginal peoples themselves. So when I refer to “Aboriginal governments” in
this paper, I am referring to the governments of those self-governing units, as identified
and constituted by the Aboriginal peoples.
Before turning to the issue of the jurisdiction of inherent right Aboriginal
governments, it is important to point out as well that this jurisdiction is protected by the
Canadian Constitution to the extent that it is an Aboriginal or treaty right. This is

C.N.L.R. 103 (F.C.T.D.); Sparvier v. Cowessess Indian Band #73, [1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 182 (F.C.T.D.); Crow v.
Blood Indian Band Council, [1997] 3 C.N.L.R. 76 (F.C.T.D.); McLeod Lake Indian Band v. Chingee, [1999] 1
C.N.L.R. 106 (F.C.T.D.).
7
In R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, the Supreme Court decided that the Aboriginal rights
of the “Indians” (and presumably the Inuit) depend in Canadian law on their practices, customs and
traditions at the time of contact with Europeans.
8
In R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, the Supreme Court used effective European control rather
than European contact as the appropriate time for determining the existence of Métis rights.
9
See Wayne Warry, Unfinished Dreams: Community Healing and the Reality of Aboriginal SelfGovernment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), especially at 51-61.
10
See RCAP Report, above note 1, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, 234.
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because section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that “the existing aboriginal
and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed”. This section provides constitutional protection to those rights, the significance
of which will be discussed later in this paper, especially in relation to the paramountcy of
the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments.
I think the two main issues to be addressed in relation to the jurisdiction of
inherent right Aboriginal governments are its source and its scope. A third, related issue
is the relationship between this jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the federal and
provincial governments. This raises issues of concurrency and paramountcy. These
matters will be discussed in the context of the Canadian legal system and the Canadian
Constitution in the three parts of this paper that follow. The Aboriginal peoples’ right of
self-determination, in international law or as a basic human right, could entitle them to
exercise broad jurisdiction, but this matter will not be addressed in this paper.

1.

Source of the Jurisdiction of Aboriginal Governments
(a) Aboriginal Perspectives
Many Aboriginal people say that the source of their inherent jurisdiction is the

Creator, who placed them in North America and instructed them in the proper ways of
living. Harold Cardinal and Walter Hildebrandt, relying on statements by Elders at
Treaty Elder Forums conducted in Saskatchewan the late 1990s, explained it this way:
The Elders are emphatic in their belief that it is this very special and
complete relationship with the Creator that is the source of the sovereignty
that their peoples possess. It provided the framework for the political,
social, educational, and cultural institutions and laws of their peoples that
allowed them to survive as nations from the beginning of time to the
present. In their view, it is part of the divine birthright given to their
peoples by the Creator.11

11

Harold Cardinal and Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream is That Our
Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000), 11.
See also Harold Johnson, Two Families: Treaties and Government (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2007).
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From this viewpoint, their political authority has a spiritual or divine basis, rather
than a secular or human basis.12 Other Aboriginal leaders have expressed similar
views.13 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples summed it up this way:
Sovereignty, in the words of one brief, is “the original freedom conferred
to our people by the Creator rather than a temporal power.” As a gift from
the Creator, sovereignty can neither be given nor taken away, nor can its
basic terms be negotiated. This view is shared by many Aboriginal
people, whose political traditions are infused with a deep sense of
spirituality and a sense of the interconnectedness of all things. Such
concepts as sovereignty, self-government and the land, which for some
Canadians have largely secular definitions, all retain a spiritual dimension
in contemporary Aboriginal thinking.14
While one has to be careful applying English terms and European concepts to Aboriginal
societies,15 the basic point is that for Aboriginal people “sovereignty” and “jurisdiction”
are inherent, with spiritual origins that are infused with a holistic view of the world.16

(b) Non-Aboriginal Canadian Perspectives
From the perspective of the Canadian legal system, the source of the inherent
jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments appears to be more secular than spiritual. While
not denying the spiritual dimensions of Aboriginal rights, the Supreme Court of Canada
has said that those rights, including the inherent right of self-government, are based on
the fact that Aboriginal nations occupied lands as peoples with their own distinctive

12

See generally Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, “Tribal Traditions and European-Western
Political Ideologies: The Dilemma of Canada’s Native Indians” (1984) 17 Canadian Journal of Political
Science 537, especially at 543.
13
See, for example, Oren Lyons, “Traditional Native Philosophies Relating to Aboriginal Rights”, in
Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, eds., The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 19 at 19: “Aboriginal rights were given to us by the Creator
when we were put here.”
14
RCAP Report, above note 1, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, at 109, quoting from Chiefs of Ontario, “Submission to
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1993)”, 19.
15
See RCAP Report, above note 1, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, at 111-12; Patricia Monture-Angus, Journeying
Forward: Dreaming First Nations’ Independence (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999), especially at 3538; Dale Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2006), especially at 57-70.
16
See generally Marie Battiste, ed., Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2000).
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cultures prior to European colonization. In R. v. Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer put it
this way:
In my view, the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and
affirmed by s. 35(1) [of the Constitution Act, 1982], because of one simple
fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were
already here, living in communities on the land, and participating in
distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It is this fact, and this
fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from all other
minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special
legal, and now constitutional, status.17
The words “living in communities” are significant because they reveal acceptance by the
Supreme Court of the obvious fact that the Aboriginal peoples lived in organized
societies prior to European colonization. This has been affirmed in subsequent decisions,
leading courts to the conclusion that Aboriginal rights are communal (that is, are held by
Aboriginal people as social and political collectivities rather than as individuals).18
In other cases, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the sovereign,
political dimensions of these Aboriginal societies. For example, in R. v. Sioui Justice
Lamer wrote, in relation to the period prior to the conquest of French Canada by the
British in 1759-60, that
… we can conclude from the historical documents that both Great Britain
and France felt that the Indian nations had sufficient independence and
played a large enough role in North America for it to be good policy to
maintain relations with them very close to those maintained between
sovereign nations.
The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the
alliance of each Indian nation and to encourage nations allied with the
enemy to change sides. When these efforts met with success, they were
incorporated in treaties of alliance or neutrality.19
More recently, in Haida Nation v. British Columbia, Chief Justice McLachlin explained
that “[t]reaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed

17

R. v. Van der Peet, above note 7 at para. 30.
See R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at para. 67; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
1010 at para. 115; Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at para. 9; R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC
54 at paras. 26, 31, 74.
19
R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at 1052-53.
18
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Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed by s.35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982.”20
In Canadian law, the pre-existing sovereignty of the Aboriginal nations is
therefore the source of their inherent right of self-government, and thus of the jurisdiction
of Aboriginal governments. From this perspective, their jurisdiction therefore appears to
have a factual, historical basis, rather than a spiritual one.
The scope of the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments depends to a large degree
on the source of that jurisdiction. Once again, one can view this matter from different
perspectives, in particular the perspectives of Aboriginal peoples and the perspective of
the non-Aboriginal, Canadian legal system.

2.

Scope of the Jurisdiction of Aboriginal Governments
(a) Aboriginal Perspectives
We have seen that many Aboriginal people regard the Creator as the source of the

inherent jurisdiction of their governments. From this perspective, one would expect the
scope of the jurisdiction to depend on the authority the Creator gave to the Aboriginal
nations. The Creator may have given them complete or plenary authority over every
possible matter that might arise, from hunting and fishing to matters like hydroelectric
power generation that were totally outside any human’s contemplation at the time the
authority was given. Or the authority may have been limited to specific matters, or have
had certain restrictions placed on it. Leroy Little Bear has written, for example, that the
authority Aboriginal nations have in relation to their lands has conditions placed on it:
To Natives it is as though the Creator, the original one to grant the land to
the Indians, put a condition on it whereby the land remains Indian land “so
long as there are Indians,” “so long as it is not alienated,” “on condition
that it is used only by Indians,” etc…. Finally, a point raised above must
be emphasized: that is, the source of the Indians’ title to their land can be

20

Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 at para. 20.
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traced back to the Creator, who gave it not only to human beings, but to all
living creatures.21
As a consequence, he observed that in treaties with the Crown
Indians could not give an interest even equal to what they were originally
granted, because to do so would break the condition under which the land
was granted by the Creator. Furthermore, they are not the sole owners under
the original grant from the Creator; the land belongs to past generations, to
the yet-to-be-born, and to the plants and animals.22
In this regard, I think it should be kept in mind that the scope of the jurisdiction
any Aboriginal nation received from the Creator is a matter that is within the traditional
knowledge of that nation’s people. The holders of this knowledge are the Elders or other
members of the community who are recognized by the nation as the keepers or custodians
of this knowledge. These are the people who would have to be consulted in order to
understand the scope of the jurisdiction given by the Creator. While this understanding
could vary from one Aboriginal nation to another, it seems that Aboriginal people
generally regard human beings as an integral part of the natural world, and that this
worldview affects the way they view political authority. Humans were not placed on
Earth to dominate and exploit it, but to share it with the rest of Nature and to care for it
by fulfilling the responsibilities placed on them by the Creator.23 Oren Lyons, a
Faithkeeper of the Onondaga Nation, put it this way:
We are the aboriginal people and we have the right to look after all life on
this earth. We share the land in common, not only among ourselves but
with the animals and everything that lives in our land. It is our
responsibility. Each generation must fulfil its responsibility under the law
of the Creator. Our forefathers did their part, and now we have to do ours.
Aboriginal rights means aboriginal responsibility, and we were put here to
fulfil that responsibility.24

21

Leroy Little Bear, “Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian ‘Grundnorm’”, in J. Rick Ponting, ed.,
Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 243 at
246.
22
Little Bear, above note 21 at 247. See also Fred Plain, “A Treatise on the Rights of the Aboriginal
Peoples of the Continent of North America”, in Boldt and Long, above note 13, 31 at 34.
23
See RCAP Report, above note 1, Vol. 1, at 628-34; Ovide Mercredi and Mary Ellen Turpel, In the
Rapids: Navigating the Future of First Nations (Toronto: Viking, 1993), especially at 16; J. Donald
Hughes, American Indian Ecology (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1983).
24
Lyons, above note 13 at 19-20.
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This understanding can be contrasted with the Judeo-Christian worldview brought to
North America by Europeans, which places humans above the natural world and directs
them to dominate and exploit it for their own purposes.25
So if there were limits placed on the authority given to a particular Aboriginal
nation by the Creator, this does not mean that the authority the Creator withheld could be
exercised by some other government, such as the government of a European nation at the
time of colonization or the government of Canada today. Leroy Little Bear did not
suggest, for example, that because Aboriginal people had conditions placed on their
ownership and were not the sole owners of the land, Europeans could come in and claim
an interest for themselves. On the contrary, he expressly rejected the notion that the
British Crown could acquire an underlying title to Indian land by discovery or means
other than purchase or treaty.26 So with regard to governmental authority, any
jurisdiction not given to an Aboriginal nation would have been retained by the Creator, or
perhaps more accurately would have been interwoven with the responsibilities of the
people of that nation to the Creator and the rest of the natural world.27 Consequently,
limitations on the authority given to an Aboriginal nation would not create a
jurisdictional vacuum that could be filled by a colonizing European government. For a
European nation to usurp jurisdiction in this way would interfere with the sacred
relationship between the Aboriginal nation and the Creator, and would violate Aboriginal
understandings of the place of human beings in the natural world and the responsibilities
that flow from the gifts they have received form the Creator.

25

See The Bible, King James Version, Genesis 1:28, referring to human beings: “And God blessed
them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon
the earth.” This passage was relied upon by William Blackstone in his very influential Commentaries on
the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-69), Vol. 2, at 2-3, to conclude that “[t]his is the only
true and solid foundation of man’s dominion over external things.”
26
Little Bear, above note 21 at 255-56. See also the words of Oren Lyons, quoted above in text
accompanying not 24.
27
This understanding can be viewed as an aspect of the humility of Aboriginal peoples regarding
their place and authority on Earth. It can be contrasted with European assertions of dominance and
unlimited power, expressed, for example, in the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Blackstone,
above note 25, Vol. 1 at 160, relying on Chief Justice Edward Coke, described the “power and jurisdiction
of Parliament [as] so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons,
within any bounds.” An Aboriginal assessment of this kind of attitude to political authority is revealed by
“the typical interpretation of sovereignty in the Cree languages, [namely] ‘pretending to be God’
(mandohkasowin)”: Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism”, above note 3 at 246 n.18.
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Aboriginal people also describe the scope of the governmental authority of their
nations in historical terms.28 When Europeans arrived in North America, Aboriginal
nations were already here and were not subject to any human limitations on the
jurisdiction they could exercise. In this sense, they were as sovereign as the nations of
Europe. George Erasmus and Joe Sanders put it this way:
It is a matter of historical record that before the arrival of Europeans …
First Nations possessed and exercised absolute sovereignty over what is
now called the North American continent.29
As pointed out by Patrick Macklem, this historical approach is supported by European
traditions that regard prior occupancy as a source of rights.30 It also forms the basis for
the case law that acknowledges the inherent sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Indian
nations in the United States.31 These American cases have been relied on by the Supreme
Court of Canada in leading Aboriginal rights decisions.32

(b) Non-Aboriginal Canadian Perspectives
Canadian courts have just begun to grapple with the matter of the inherent right of
self-government of the Aboriginal nations. So far, there is a lack of clear guidance from
the courts on the content of this right, and therefore on the scope of the jurisdiction of

28

See generally Mercredi and Turpel, above note 23 at 13-36.
George Erasmus and Joe Sanders, “Canadian History: An Aboriginal Perspective”, in John Bird,
Lorraine Land and Murray Macadam, eds., Nation to Nation: Aboriginal Sovereignty and the Future of
Canada, New Edition (Toronto: Irwin Publishers, 2002), 3 at 3. See also Grand Chief Michael Mitchell,
“An Unbroken Assertion of Sovereignty”, in Boyce Richardson, ed., Drumbeat: Anger and Renewal in
Indian Country (Toronto: Summerhill Press and the Assembly of First Nations, 1989), 107.
30
Patrick Macklem, “Normative Dimensions of the Right of Self-Government”, in Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Aboriginal Self-Government: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1995), 1 at 9-17.
31
See especially Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
32
See, for example, Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; R. v. Sioui,
above note 19; R. v. Van der Peet, above note 7; Mitchell v. M.N.R., above note 18. For further discussion,
see Kent McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal
Coherence”, in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal
Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights, forthcoming, UBC Press, Vancouver [McNeil,
“Judicial Approaches to Self-Government”].
29
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Aboriginal governments.33 However, I think one can identify at least two different
approaches to this matter that have been taken by the courts. I will start by describing
these approaches, and then will suggest a third approach that has received less judicial
endorsement, but that I regard as preferable because I think it makes more sense
conceptually, is more consistent with historical reality, and is more just.
(i) Approach #1: R. v. Pamajewon
The first and only case where the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed the
existence of the inherent right of self-government directly is the Court’s 1996 decision in
R. v. Pamajewon.34 This case involved claims by two Anishnabe or Ojibwa First Nations
in Ontario that they have a right of self-government in relation to gambling on their
reserves. They claimed this right as part of a broader right to use and manage their
reserve lands. Chief Justice Lamer, delivering the judgment of the Court, said that the
First Nations had framed their right too broadly. Instead of a general right to govern the
use of their reserve lands, he decided the claim should be characterized as a right to
participate in and regulate gambling on their reserves.
Having characterized the claimed right in this narrow way, the Chief Justice
decided that, in order to prove the right, the First Nations had to show that gambling had
been integral to their distinctive Ojibwa culture at the time of contact with Europeans
(probably at least 350 years before the case came to court). In other words, they had to
convince the judges that gambling was such an important aspect of their culture that their
society would be significantly different without it.35 This test for proof of Aboriginal
rights (other than Aboriginal title to land36), known as the “integral to the distinctive
33

See Kent McNeil, “The Inherent Right of Self-Government: Emerging Directions for Legal
Research”, online: http://fngovernance.org/publications/index.htm; McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to SelfGovernment”, above note 32.
34
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 821.
35
Note that in R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, above note 18, the Supreme Court appears to have relaxed
this test somewhat. Justice Bastarache wrote at para. 41: “The notion that the pre-contact practice must be
a ‘defining feature’ of the aboriginal society, such that the culture would be ‘fundamentally altered’ without
it, has also served in some cases to create artificial barriers to the recognition and affirmation of aboriginal
rights…. [C]ourts should be cautious in considering whether the particular aboriginal culture would have
been fundamentally altered had the gathering activity in question not been pursued.”
36
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, above note 18, the Supreme Court decided that Aboriginal
title to land can be established by proving exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of
sovereignty. See also R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220. For discussion, see Kent
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culture” test, was created by the Supreme Court in the Van der Peet case,37 decided the
day before the judgment in Pamajewon was handed down. The Van der Peet case
involved a claim to an Aboriginal right to sell fish, not a right of self-government.
Nonetheless, in Pamajewon the Chief Justice said that the same test applies because
“claims to self-government are no different from other claims to the enjoyment of
aboriginal rights and must, as such, be measured against the same standard.”38
The “integral to the distinctive culture” test for proof of Aboriginal rights has
been severely criticized by legal academics and other commentators.39 Among other
things, they have pointed out that the test wrongfully assumes that Aboriginal rights can
be identified by taking a snapshot of Aboriginal cultures at an arbitrary time in the past,
resulting in a frozen rights approach that ignores the dynamic nature of Aboriginal
cultures. The application of the test to self-government claims has also been criticized.40
Contrary to what Chief Justice Lamer said, exercise of governmental authority is very
different from Aboriginal rights that involve access to natural resources such as fish.41
Moreover, by limiting self-government claims to matters that were integral to Aboriginal
cultures prior to European contact, the test does not take account of the very significant
adaptations that Aboriginal nations have been obliged to make to come to terms with the
impact of European colonization. Nor does the test permit Aboriginal nations to govern
themselves in the modern world in accordance with their current needs and priorities.
Finally, because the test fragments the right of self-government into piece-meal
McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening?” (2006) 69 Saskatchewan Law
Review 281.
37
R. v. Van der Peet, above note 7.
38
R. v. Pamajewon, above note 34 at para. 24.
39
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jurisdiction over specific subject matters such as gambling, Aboriginal nations are
required to prove every aspect of their jurisdiction separately. This places an impractical
burden of proof and unreasonable costs upon them.
Despite the criticisms of the “integral to the distinctive culture” test and of its
application to self-government claims, the fact remains that Pamajewon is a decision of
the Supreme Court that remains the law of Canada until overruled or modified by the
Court or supplanted by amendment of the Canadian Constitution. We therefore need to
consider the implications of the decision for the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments.
The Pamajewon approach means that Aboriginal nations start with an empty box insofar
as jurisdiction is concerned.42 If they assert a section 35(1) right of self-government in
Canadian courts, it is up to them to prove that each matter they claim jurisdiction over
was integral to their distinctive culture, and apparently regulated by them, at the time of
European contact. Jurisdiction therefore has to be established piece by piece. The total
jurisdiction of any Aboriginal nation is therefore the sum of all the matters that nation can
establish jurisdiction over in this way. This approach obviously does not offer much
promise for Aboriginal nations that would like the courts to acknowledge that they have
broad jurisdiction to govern their territories and peoples so they can be active participants
in the modern world.
The impracticality of the Pamajewon approach may, however, be tempered to
some extent if the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Haida Nation v. British
Columbia applies to self-government claims. In that case, Chief Justice McLachlin said
that the “Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal
interests where claims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the process
of treaty negotiation and proof. It must respect these potential, but yet unproven,
interests.”43 The Court held that the Crown has a duty to consult with the Aboriginal
nation making the claim, and in appropriate circumstances accommodate its interests.
Although the Haida decision related to an Aboriginal title claim, this duty could apply to
42
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self-government claims as well, requiring the Crown to consult with Aboriginal nations
in situations where the exercise of jurisdiction by Parliament, for example, has an impact
on Aboriginal claims to a right of self-government.
(ii)

Approach #2: Campbell v. British Columbia

The first modern treaty in British Columbia was entered into by the Nisga’a
Nation, and came into effect in 2000. Among the detailed provisions of this treaty is a
chapter that acknowledges the inherent right of self-government of the Nisga’a Nation
and sets out the jurisdiction of the Nisga’a Lisims government and the Nisga’a Village
governments. Gordon Campbell, who was then the leader of the opposition in the British
Columbia legislature, and two of his Liberal colleagues commenced a case in the British
Columbia Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the self-government
provisions in the Nisga’a Treaty. This case is known as Campbell v. British Columbia.44
Among other things, Mr. Campbell and his colleagues argued that the Canadian
Constitution did not leave any space for Aboriginal governments because all the
legislative powers had been distributed between the federal and provincial governments
by the Constitution Act, 1867.
Justice Williamson heard the Campbell case and rejected the arguments made
against the constitutional validity of the Nisga’a Treaty’s self-government provisions. He
decided that legislative powers had not been exhaustively distributed in 1867, and so
there was room in the Canadian Constitution for Aboriginal governments to exist and to
exercise inherent jurisdiction. What the self-government provisions of the Nisga’a Treaty
did was define the inherent jurisdiction of the Nisga’a Nation and set it down in writing.
He saw no problem with the parties to the treaty settling the matter in this way. In fact,
the Supreme Court of Canada had been encouraging Aboriginal peoples and the Crown to
enter into negotiated agreements rather than try to resolve their differences by litigation.45
Among other reasons, Justice Williamson upheld the constitutional validity of the
self-government provisions by relying on the 1997 decision of Chief Justice Lamer in
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada
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examined the claims of the Gitksan (or Gitxsan) and Wet’suwet’en Nations in British
Columbia to Aboriginal title to the lands in their traditional territories. Those nations
also claimed a right of self-government over their territories and peoples, but the
Supreme Court passed over that aspect of the case without saying anything about the
validity of that claim, other than suggesting that, in light of R. v. Pamajewon, it had been
framed too broadly. However, in his discussion of Aboriginal title Chief Justice Lamer
made the following observations that were interpreted by Justice Williamson in Campbell
as an acknowledgment of the inherent right of self-government:
A further dimension of aboriginal title is the fact that it is held
communally. Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal
persons. It is a collective right to land held by all members of an
aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that land are also made by
that community.46
Referring to this passage, Justice Williamson said this:
Can it be, as the plaintiffs’ submission would hold, that a limited right to
self-government cannot be protected constitutionally by Section 35(1) [of
the Constitution Act, 1982]? I think not. The above passages from
Delgamuukw suggesting the right for the community to decide to what
uses the land encompassed by their Aboriginal title can be put are
determinative of the question. The right to Aboriginal title “in its full
form”, including the right for the community to make decisions as to the
use of the land and therefore the right to have a political structure for
making those decisions, is, I conclude, constitutionally guaranteed by
Section 35.
An analysis of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Delgamuukw can lead to no other result.47
Justice Williamson’s interpretation of Delgamuukw provides the basis for a
second judicial approach to the issue of the inherent right of self-government. Aboriginal
title to land, and indeed all other Aboriginal and treaty rights as well, are communal in
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nature.48 Aboriginal communities must, therefore, have decision-making authority over
how those rights can be exercised. As Justice Williamson said, there must be “a political
structure” – that is, a government – within the community for exercising this authority.
Consequently, Aboriginal nations must have an inherent right of self-government in
relation to all their Aboriginal and treaty rights. Moreover, given that the Campbell
decision was not appealed, Justice Williamson’s judgment is the law, at least in British
Columbia.
What, then, is the scope of the jurisdiction of inherent right Aboriginal
governments under this second approach? Unless set out in a treaty such as the Nisga’a
Treaty,49 the scope of their jurisdiction is determined by the extent of the Aboriginal and
other treaty rights of the Aboriginal nation claiming the jurisdiction. With regard to their
Aboriginal title lands, this means they have jurisdiction over the management and use of
those lands and of the resources on and under them, such as forests and minerals.50 They
also have jurisdiction over their hunting and fishing rights, and over any other matters in
relation to which they are able to establish Aboriginal or treaty rights. This could include
jurisdiction over such things as family matters, education, and health care. However, in
litigation this still places the onus of proof on Aboriginal peoples – in order to establish
jurisdiction over any particular subject matter, they first have to prove that they have an
Aboriginal or treaty right in relation to that matter. Where Aboriginal title to land is
concerned, this means proving that they were in exclusive occupation of the claimed land
at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty.51 Where other Aboriginal rights are
concerned, they have to prove those rights in accordance with the “integral to the
distinctive culture” test laid down by the Supreme Court in the Van der Peet case.52
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Where treaty rights are concerned, they have to convince a court that the treaty relied
upon provides the rights they are claiming.53
So as in the case of the first approach that came from the Pamajewon decision, the
second approach derived from Justice Williamson’s decision in Campbell also means that
Aboriginal governments start with an empty box of jurisdiction. The onus is on them to
fill this box by proving Aboriginal or treaty rights, or a combination of Aboriginal and
treaty rights. The second approach, while more generous to Aboriginal peoples than the
first approach, therefore has limitations, and places a heavy burden of proof on
Aboriginal claimants who try to prove their rights in Canadian courts. However, in
situations where Aboriginal rights are asserted but not yet proven, we have seen that the
Crown has a duty to consult the Aboriginal nation making the claim and to accommodate
their interests in appropriate circumstances. Those interests would include their claim to
a right of self-government over the Aboriginal rights being asserted. For the Haida
Nation, for example, this should mean that the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate
has to take into account their decision-making authority – that is, their right of selfgovernment – over their Aboriginal title lands.
But despite the opening provided by the Haida Nation decision, I think the
Campbell approach, while preferable to the Pamajewon approach, is still problematic.
Neither Campbell nor Pamajewon takes account of the obvious historical fact – a fact
accepted by the Supreme Court in Sioui and Haida Nation54 – that the Aboriginal peoples
were independent nations prior to European colonization. And both approaches are
impractical because, when an Aboriginal right of self-government is claimed in court,
they do not allow for inherent Aboriginal jurisdiction to extend to matters that were not
integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures prior to European contact, are not in relation to
Aboriginal title, or have not been defined by a treaty such as the Nisga’a Treaty. Both
approaches could therefore exclude jurisdiction over matters that are vital for Aboriginal
nations to realistically exercise governmental authority in the modern world. I am
therefore going to suggest a third approach that has not yet been accepted as such by
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Canadian courts, but that is more consistent with historical fact and with the present-day
needs of Aboriginal nations.
(iii) Approach #3: Residual Aboriginal Jurisdiction
The third approach starts with the undeniable fact that the Aboriginal peoples
were independent prior to European colonization of North America. As the Supreme
Court has acknowledged, they lived in organized societies and exercised political
authority as nations. Borrowing the words of Chief Justice McLachlin in Haida Nation,
they had “pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty.”55
What was the scope of their jurisdiction as independent, sovereign nations? We
have seen that, according to the traditions of at least some Aboriginal peoples, that
jurisdiction came from the Creator and may have had limitations, in the form of
responsibilities, placed on it. Those responsibilities might restrict the authority of
Aboriginal governments vis-à-vis the Creator. For example, certain uses of spiritually
significant sites might not be permissible if those uses were beyond what was authorized
by the Creator’s laws. But we have also seen that this does not mean there would be a
jurisdictional vacuum that would permit another government, such as that of a colonizing
European nation, to come in and authorize uses that would violate the Aboriginal
people’s traditions. Moreover, the Aboriginal nation would be responsible for the site
and would have an obligation to protect it from unauthorized uses by any human beings,
in keeping with the sense of responsibility that Aboriginal peoples generally have to the
land.56 So restrictions on the uses that nation could make of the site would not mean that
its government would have no jurisdiction over it. Moreover, any limitations on that
nation’s jurisdiction would not mean that another nation could assert jurisdiction and
ignore the restrictions.
Apart from any limitations contained in the original gift of jurisdiction by the
Creator, the jurisdiction Aboriginal nations had prior to European colonization would
have been all-encompassing. As factually independent nations, they would have had
55
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complete authority within their own territories (territorial jurisdiction) and over their own
citizens (personal jurisdiction). In other words, they would have had a full box of
jurisdictional powers.57 The third approach I am suggesting therefore starts with this full
box. Instead of envisaging an empty box of jurisdiction and expecting Aboriginal
peoples to meet formidable burdens of proof in order to fill it, this approach accepts that
the Aboriginal nations had plenary jurisdiction at the time of colonization. This is
consistent with the historical reality of Aboriginal North America, and is supported by
American law.58 By contrast, the empty box position endorsed by Canadian courts in the
first two approaches we have examined amounts to a denial of this reality. It is also
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reliance on American case law and its acceptance
of the pre-existing sovereignty of the Aboriginal nations.
The approach I am suggesting has very significant implications for the onus of
proving the jurisdiction of inherent right Aboriginal governments. Because one starts
with plenary Aboriginal jurisdiction, there is no need for Aboriginal peoples to prove the
components of their jurisdiction. Instead, the onus is on the Crown to show how their
complete jurisdiction has been diminished.59 Canadian case law provides some guidance
on how this might be done.
First, according to Justice Binnie, who wrote a separate judgment (concurred in
by Justice Major) in Mitchell v. M.N.R.,60 acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown
reduced the jurisdiction of the Aboriginal nations by taking away authority that would be
incompatible with Crown sovereignty.61 The positive side of this is that Justice Binnie
implied that Aboriginal jurisdiction is residual, so that it could include all governmental
57
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authority that is not incompatible with Crown sovereignty. He was nonetheless of the
opinion that control of Canada’s borders is essential to Crown sovereignty, and so
Aboriginal nations cannot have an Aboriginal right to bring goods from the United States
into Canada without obeying Canada’s customs laws.62 So apparently Aboriginal
jurisdiction in relation to trade over what are now international borders was lost and so
has to be subtracted from the complete jurisdiction the Aboriginal nations had prior to
European colonization. Another example Justice Binnie gave of lost jurisdiction relates
to military matters that are vital to the defence of Canada. Nonetheless, he said that the
doctrine of sovereign incompatibility must be applied “sparingly” and “with caution”.63
In particular, he pointed out that “the sovereign incompatibility principle has not
prevented the United States (albeit with its very different constitutional framework) from
continuing to recognize forms of internal aboriginal self-government which it considers
to be expressions of residual aboriginal sovereignty.”64 But if the doctrine of sovereign
incompatibility is accepted by the Supreme Court,65 it may be a means for the Crown to
prove that some aspects of Aboriginal jurisdiction have been lost.66
A second way in which the Crown might be able to prove that the jurisdiction of
inherent right governments has been diminished would be to show that aspects of that
jurisdiction have been extinguished, either unilaterally by or under valid legislation prior
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to the enactment section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, or voluntarily by treaty.67
However, the burden on the Crown to prove extinguishment of any Aboriginal right is
onerous. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, Chief Justice Lamer expressed it this way:
That standard [of extinguishment] was laid down in Sparrow [68], at p.
1099, as one of “clear and plain” intent. In that decision, the Court drew a
distinction between laws which extinguished aboriginal rights, and those
which merely regulated them. Although the latter types of laws may have
been “necessarily inconsistent” with the continued exercise of aboriginal
rights, they could not extinguish those rights. While the requirement of
clear and plain intent does not, perhaps, require that the Crown “use
language which refers expressly to its extinguishment of aboriginal rights”
(Gladstone [69] at para. 34), the standard is still quite high.70
It would therefore appear that exercise of jurisdiction in relation to Aboriginal peoples by
the Parliament of Canada, for example, over a particular subject matter would not of itself
extinguish the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments in relation to that matter. For
extinguishment to occur, the intention of Parliament to that effect would have to be
demonstratively manifest.71 Moreover, if the inherent right of self-government is a single
Aboriginal right, legislative restrictions on the exercise of that right would probably be
infringements rather than extinguishments,72 and so the infringement approach discussed
below would apply.
Extinguishment of the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments by treaty is legally
possible, but this would depend on the terms of the treaty the Crown is relying on for this
purpose. The Supreme Court has laid down a number of rules for treaty interpretation
that would make it more difficult for the Crown to establish extinguishment in this way.
For example, treaties are to be interpreted liberally, and any ambiguities are to be
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resolved in favour of the Aboriginal parties.73 Moreover, the historical, political, and
cultural contexts need to be taken into account, and oral understandings have to be
incorporated into treaties along with the written terms.74 While the Aboriginal parties
may have acknowledged that the Crown was a sovereign entity with whom jurisdiction
could be shared, it is unlikely that they intended to cede their own jurisdiction to the
Crown.75 This would, however, depend on the treaty in question and the historical,
political, and cultural contexts in which it was negotiated.
Thirdly, the Crown might try to prove that the jurisdiction of Aboriginal
governments has been diminished by infringement of the inherent right of selfgovernment by or pursuant to legislation. If the infringement occurred before section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force on April 17, 1982, justification of the
infringement would not have been required when it took place. However, the legislature
enacting the infringing legislation would have had to have the constitutional authority to
do so. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gave the Parliament of Canada
exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”.

In

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court held that Aboriginal rights are
within the core of this federal jurisdiction.76 In its recent decision in

R. v. Morris , the

Court came to the same conclusion regarding treaty rights.77 So while the Canadian
Parliament could have infringed the jurisdiction of inherent right Aboriginal governments
without justification prior to April 17, 1982, it is doubtful whether provincial legislatures
had the constitutional authority to do so.78
When Aboriginal rights received constitutional protection by section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, a major change took place. Since then, those rights have not been
73
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extinguishable by the federal government, even by legislation.79 The protection against
extinguishment that had been in place against the provinces since Confederation was thus
extended to protection against Parliament. However, Parliament (and possibly provincial
legislatures) can still infringe Aboriginal rights, including the inherent right of selfgovernment, if the infringement can be justified in accordance with the test laid down by
the Supreme Court in 1990 in R. v. Sparrow.80 This test requires the Crown to prove that
the infringement is for a valid legislative objective, and that the Crown’s fiduciary
obligations have been respected. The second part of this test involves asking whether the
infringement has been limited to what is necessary to meet the objective, whether
compensation has been offered in appropriate circumstances, and whether the Aboriginal
people in question have been consulted.

As we have seen, the requirement for

consultation applies even if the claimed right has not yet been proven.81
So in situations where the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments has been
infringed by or pursuant to constitutionally valid legislation, for the infringement to be
effective after April 17, 1982, it would have to be justified in accordance with the
Sparrow test. This requirement for justification applies to infringements taking place
before but continuing after that date, as well as to those taking place later.82 If the
Crown could not meet the burden of proof required by this test, the infringement would
be invalid and could be ignored by the Aboriginal governments. Moreover, even valid
infringements would only suspend the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments for as long
as the infringing law was in force and continued to be justifiable. If the law was repealed
or the infringement ceased to be justifiable, the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments
that had been suspended by the infringement would once again be exercisable.
To sum up the third approach, the starting point is the complete jurisdiction that
Aboriginal peoples had as independent nations prior to European colonization.
Depending on whether the Supreme Court accepts the doctrine of sovereign
incompatibility, this jurisdiction may have been reduced to the extent that it is
79
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inconsistent with Crown sovereignty. It also could have been extinguished in whole, and
possibly in part, by or pursuant to constitutionally valid legislation, but the onus of
proving extinguishment is on the Crown and the burden of proof is onerous. In principle,
it could also have been extinguished in whole or in part by treaty, but this would depend
on a proper understanding of the treaty in its historical, political, and cultural context.
Finally, to the extent that the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments was not lost or
extinguished prior to the coming into force of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
it would have received constitutional protection and could no longer be extinguished
unilaterally by or pursuant to legislation. After that, extinguishment would require the
consent of the Aboriginal nation in question. The jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments
could, however, still be infringed by legislation, but only if the infringement could be
justified in accordance with the Sparrow test.

3.

Concurrent Jurisdiction and Paramountcy
Aboriginal governments exercising inherent jurisdiction in the context of section

35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, do not act in isolation. They necessarily have
relationships with other governments – Aboriginal, federal, provincial, territorial, and
municipal – with whom they share jurisdiction. Where the federal and provincial
governments in particular are concerned, there are bound to be overlaps in jurisdiction.
For example, provinces have jurisdiction over education and health care, which are
matters that are likely to be found within the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments as
well. We have also seen that the federal government has broad jurisdiction over “Indians,
and Lands reserved for the Indians”, which probably includes jurisdiction over most if
not all matters within the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments.83 It is therefore
apparent that the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments is concurrent with the
jurisdiction of other governments in many respects, requiring paramountcy rules to
determine whether the laws of Aboriginal governments or those of the federal or
provincial governments prevail in the case of conflict. In the limited space available in
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this paper, I can do no more than suggest a broad outline for approaching these complex
issues.
Regardless of which of the three approaches to the jurisdiction of Aboriginal
governments described in the preceding part of this paper is adopted, these issues of
concurrent jurisdiction and paramountcy will arise. On the first approach described
above (the Pamajewon approach), we have seen that the jurisdiction of Aboriginal
governments depends on the matters Aboriginal nations can prove are within their
inherent right of self-government through application of the “integral to the distinctive
culture” test. On the second approach (the Campbell approach), their jurisdiction
depends on the other Aboriginal rights and title, and treaty rights, that they are able to
prove and over which they have decision-making authority. On the third approach (the
residual sovereignty approach), their jurisdiction is whatever remains of their complete
governmental authority after subtracting jurisdiction that has been lost, possibly through
incompatibility with Crown sovereignty, extinguishment, or justifiable infringement.
Subject to applicable burdens of proof being met, on each approach Aboriginal
governments have definable areas of jurisdiction that are probably concurrent with the
areas of jurisdiction of Parliament and the provincial legislatures. So whose jurisdiction
is paramount in the event of conflicting exercise of jurisdiction?
This is an area where Canadian courts have not yet provided much direct
guidance. Nonetheless, I think one can give at least a tentative answer by applying
general principles of Canadian law derived from decisions the courts have handed down.
In my opinion, no matter which of the three approaches one takes to the jurisdiction of
Aboriginal governments, it will generally be concurrent with the jurisdiction of either the
federal or a provincial government, or with that of both. This is because sections 91 and
92 in particular of the Constitution Act, 1867 distributed broad legislative and executive
authority to the federal and provincial governments, including the conferral by section
91(24) of exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” to the
Parliament of Canada. In addition, section 91 gave Parliament residual jurisdiction over
all subject matters not assigned to the provincial legislatures. But as pointed out by
Justice Williamson in the Campbell case,84 this distribution of legislative and executive
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authority did not take away the inherent right of self-government of the Aboriginal
peoples.85 He went on to hold that this right has been included as an Aboriginal right in
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This means that since 1982 Aboriginal
jurisdiction has been protected from infringement by the exercise of both federal and
provincial jurisdiction, unless the infringement can be justified in accordance with the
Sparrow test. Moreover, if a province attempts to exercise its jurisdiction in a way that
affects the core of federal jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”,
it should be precluded from doing so by section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.86
Consequently, due to section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the jurisdiction
of inherent right Aboriginal governments should be paramount to the jurisdictions of the
federal and provincial governments, except in situations where an infringement of
Aboriginal jurisdiction can be justified in accordance with the Sparrow test.87 This
means that, at least in the event of a direct conflict,88 federal and provincial laws will
usually have to give way to Aboriginal laws that come within the scope of the jurisdiction
of Aboriginal governments. Federal laws will only prevail over those Aboriginal laws if
the federal government can prove a valid legislative objective for infringing the inherent
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right of self-government of the Aboriginal people concerned, and show minimal
impairment of the right, payment of compensation if economic interests of the Aboriginal
people have been affected, and adequate consultation with them.89 Where provincial
laws are concerned, however, it is doubtful whether they can ever infringe the inherent
right of self-government, given that it is an Aboriginal right that comes within the core of
exclusive federal jurisdiction under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.90
Where an Aboriginal government chooses not to exercise its jurisdiction in
relation to a particular subject matter, concurrency of jurisdiction means that federal or
provincial laws in relation to that matter will continue to apply to the Aboriginal people
and territory in question, as long as other Aboriginal and treaty rights are not infringed
(or, if infringed, as long as the infringement is justified under the Sparrow test). This
prevents a legal vacuum from occurring in relation to that matter. It also gives
Aboriginal nations the choice of continuing to operate under federal and provincial laws
in areas where they are not yet ready to take charge. Concurrency of jurisdiction can
therefore be seen as a useful device for Aboriginal peoples to rely upon to build selfgovernment capacity and to extend the exercise of their jurisdiction into new areas at
their own pace and in accordance with their own needs and priorities.91

Conclusions
For many Aboriginal peoples, the source of the inherent jurisdiction of their
governments is the Creator. The scope of their jurisdiction is therefore determined by the
authority granted to them by the Creator. Authority not granted to them would
presumably have been retained by the Creator, or take the form of responsibilities placed
on them by the Creator, and so would not have been exercisable by another government,
whether a colonizing European government or the government of Canada. Moreover, it
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is doubtful that Aboriginal peoples intended to give up jurisdiction when they entered
into treaties with the Crown. According to the oral traditions of many Aboriginal
peoples, they intended to share jurisdiction with the Crown.
The Canadian legal system has acknowledged that the Aboriginal peoples were
sovereign nations prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America. If the imposition of
Crown sovereignty diminished the sovereignty and hence the jurisdiction of the
Aboriginal nations, one would expect the onus to be on the Crown to demonstrate how
this happened and prove what jurisdiction has been taken away from them. Instead,
Canadian courts have placed the onus on Aboriginal peoples to prove what jurisdiction
they had after the imposition of Crown sovereignty. Moreover, in order to prove this
directly they have to meet a test created by the Supreme Court for proof of Aboriginal
rights generally, known as the “integral to the distinctive culture” test. Alternatively,
they can prove other Aboriginal rights, such as hunting or fishing rights or Aboriginal
title to land, and rely on their decision-making authority in relation thereto as the basis for
their jurisdiction over those rights.
Whichever approach one takes to determine the scope of the jurisdiction of
inherent right Aboriginal governments, in Canadian constitutional law this jurisdiction is
probably concurrent with the overlapping jurisdictions of the federal and provincial
governments. Prior to the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
federal laws would have been paramount over Aboriginal laws, at least in the event of
conflict between them.

Section 35(1) reversed this paramountcy by providing

constitutional protection to Aboriginal rights, including the inherent right of selfgovernment. So after April 17, 1982, Aboriginal laws should prevail over federal as well
as over provincial laws, except in situations where the Crown can prove that infringement
of Aboriginal jurisdiction by federal law is justified. As it is doubtful whether provincial
governments have ever had the authority to infringe the inherent right of selfgovernment, justification of the infringement of Aboriginal jurisdiction by provincial law
should not be constitutionally permissible.
This research paper has outlined what I believe to be the applicable principles for
determining the jurisdiction of inherent right Aboriginal governments as a matter of
Canadian constitutional law. We have seen, however, that there are at least three
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approaches to this. The first two – the Pamajewon and the Campbell approaches – have
been explicitly endorsed by Canadian courts. The third – the residual sovereignty
approach – has only been alluded to by Justice Binnie in the Mitchell case without being
accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court. I am nonetheless of the opinion that the
third approach is the only one that is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
acknowledgment of the pre-existing sovereignty of the Aboriginal nations. It also places
the onus on the Crown of proving how and to what extent that sovereignty has been
reduced, which is where I think the onus should lie as a matter of both legal principle and
justice. But given that the third approach has not yet been explicitly accepted by
Canadian courts, I cannot state that it is an expression of Canadian law.
It has often been said that the issue of the jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments
is a matter that is best settled by negotiation and agreement with the federal and
provincial (or territorial) governments. However, many Aboriginal nations are unwilling
to forgo exercising jurisdiction for years while negotiations take place. They do not need
to do so. Because their right of self-government is inherent, they can act upon it and
exercise jurisdiction without first obtaining the agreement of the federal and provincial
governments.92 If they want to avoid court challenges as much as possible, it would
probably be safest for them to exercise jurisdiction in relation to Aboriginal and treaty
rights that they claim they already have, because the Campbell case decided that they do
have a right of self-government in relation to these rights. If, for example, they have an
Aboriginal title claim to their traditional territory, they can assert a right of selfgovernment in relation to the lands and resources within that territory and exercise
jurisdiction over management and use of them. Any exercise of jurisdiction over the
same lands and resources by the provincial government, for example, would be a
potential infringement of their Aboriginal title and of their decision-making authority in
relation to those lands and resources. This would trigger a duty on the provincial
government to consult with them and, in appropriate circumstances, accommodate their
interests. In this context, those interests would include not only their claimed title to the
land but also their claimed right of self-government over it. In this situation, it would be
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advisable for the province not only to consult with the Aboriginal nation, but also to
come to a negotiated agreement with them. Otherwise, the province would expose itself
to legal liability if a court were later to uphold the Aboriginal title and self-government
rights and decide that the province lacked the constitutional authority to infringe those
rights.93
So while the full scope of Aboriginal jurisdiction remains uncertain, Canadian law
does acknowledge that it is extensive enough to provide Aboriginal nations with real
authority and substantial bargaining power in their dealings with the federal and
provincial governments.

This authority does not depend on finalization of

comprehensive agreements or treaties that define the rights of the Aboriginal nations and
the jurisdiction of their governments. Other governments have to consult with them, on a
government-to-government basis, whenever their claimed rights or interests might be
negatively affected by policies or decisions of those governments. Agreements can be
negotiated between Aboriginal nations and other governments in relation to specific
policies and projects, such as resource development on lands within those nations’
territories. Participation by Aboriginal governments in these negotiations would be an
exercise of their jurisdiction, and could lead to financial benefits that would fund other
government projects and programs within their communities. The essential point is that
Aboriginal governments can become engaged in these ways immediately – they have the
authority to do so under existing Canadian law, and do not have seek permission to
exercise their jurisdiction from the federal government, provincial governments, or
Canadian courts.
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